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Abstract: The 243,000 acres of Virginia's public oyster reefs (a.k.a. the Baylor Grounds) have been extremely productive of
usable and saleable (market .md seed) oysters (Crassostrea virginica), oyster shells and oyster shell by-products. Archaeological remains and historical records show that they have yielded great numbers of whole oysters, oyster meats, oyster
"seed" and shell since the 01esapeake was formed some 3,000 years BP. In the last century their natural productivity, as
indicated by commercial harvest records (the only long-term data available), has declined markedly. In 1904, Vrrginia's
total market (adult) oyster harvest was about 7.6 million bushels (mostly from public grounds). By 1930, roughly a
quarter-century later, the haivest from public grounds was some 1 million Va. bu. - somewhat less than a seven-fold
decline from the total of 190t By 1957, again about a quarter-century later, the public market oyster harvest was 586,000
Va. bu. - about a ten-fold reduction. This was two years before mortalities attributed to "MSX" were observed in the
Chesapeake. Disease did not cause these long-term declines! Neither increasing, but ineffectual, management efforts nor
public ostreiculture prevented them The downward trend continues.
Of the 243,000 acres of Virginia's public grounds, 199,000 are in the Chesapeake and its tributary estuaries. During the
1993-94 harvest year, only 5,484 Va. bushels of market oysters were recorded from the reefs in all of those 19,000 acres of
public grounds. Of them, 5,173 Va. bushels came from about 3,500 acres of James River "seed" oyster beds above Wreck
Shoal. The rest of the Baylor acres in the Chesapeake, some 196,000 acres, produced only 311 bushels. As an economic
entity Virginia's public oyster resource outside of the James seems economically defunct and the James is fading fast away.
The oyster resources of Maryland (and its Potomac River) have experienced the same long-term downward trends.
Peaking some 20 or so years before Virginia's at over 15 million Md. bu. in 1884-85, Ma.ryland's recorded public market
oyster harvests have declined more slowly than Virginia's. But, like Virginia's, they have dropped despite a century or
more of management efforh:, and investments of considerable amounts of money in attempts to arrest (but, apparently, not
to reverse) that decline. In 1895-96, a mere 11 years after the peak, the recorded harves;: was about 7,000,000 Md. bu. - a
50% or two-fold decline. By 1920, about 4,500,000 Md bushels. (30% of the 1884-85 high) were taken and 50 years later in
1970-71, some 2.5 million (about 17%) were reported. This approximately six-fold drop from the 1884-85 high occurred at
least 10 years before oyster mortalities attributed to the two diseases had a significant impact in Maryland waters. In
harvest year 1993-94, the recorded Maryland market oyster harvest was down to 75,633 Md. bu., or about 0.5% of the 188485 peak. These declines would have come earlier and been more severe had not large influxes of public and special fund
monies gone into repletion (shell and seed planting) of the public rocks.
The public oyster resour::es of both Maryland and Virginia, as indicated by recorded market oyster harvests and the
condition of the reef habitats, are severely reduced compared with their condition a ce:~tury ago. Because the public
grounds of both states encompass the best-quality oyster-growing bottoms of the Chesapeake; bottoms that in several
millennia since the last ice age had developed billions of animals agglomerated in hundreds of up-thrusting reefs, it is well
to ask what happened. How did this condition develop? After all, its coming was predicted by several researchers over
100 years ago, and remedies. (and preventatives) were available and recommended even then! Some were tried and
millions of public dollars were spent on legislation, regulation, enforcement, and remediation attempts. Ultimately, these
efforts failed to restore falling productivity. We ask why.
Review and analysis of available data and historical information reveal several contributing factors. But the
important ones are not those society, and science, have usually focused upon. This review prompts the conclusion
that the principal causes o:f the long-term decline in Chesapeake Bay oyster populations on the public grounds are
neither disease nor pollution but persistent overharvesting and its consequent impact on broodstock size and
composition, negative genetic impact, and associated habitat destruction. Because the state fishery management
agencies are responsible for controlling harvesting activities on the public oyster reefs, their failure, their inability, to
control harvesting pressure effectively is the first-order cause of the impending economic demise of the public
oyster resource.
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INTRODUCTION

"We have wasted our inheritance by improvidence and mismanagement and blind confidence
... " (Brooks, 1891). The eastern, or Virginia,
oyster, Crassostrea virgi.nica Gmelin, is a highly
fecund, hardy, and persistent animal. It has been
well tested in the crucible of evolution for several
million years and more recently by the extensive
environmental fluctuations occurring throughout a
cycle of at least four Ice Ages in as many
"Chesapeakes". It is quite tolerant of adverse
environmental challenges. Predation, disease,
drought, flood and other natural death-causing
factors are not new to the Chesapeake oyster.
Highly successful in "our" Chesapeake Bay for
some 3,000 years (Schubel 1981), it has survived all
hazards and challenges over the millennia.
Studies indicate that "Chesapeake area" aborigines employed oysters as food during the
entire 18,000 to 20,000 years, or so, of the last
oceanic transgression (Barber 1979). In 1607
arriving European settlers found great banks or
reefs of oysters. Many of them breached the
surface at various low-water stages (Wharton
1957). Some have disappeared from the intertidal
within the last 125 years. Until about 1830 ,Chesapeake natural oyster populations seemed to be
increasing in the face of growing human predation
or, at least, holding their own. However, since
then, especially since around 1870 or 1880, they
have not been able to do so (Stevenson 1894). For
over 120 years since peak production years of the
late 1880s, the downward trend in the Chesapeake
natural oyster population, as evidenced by recorded harvest data, has persisted. More extensive
and more accurate industry-dependent and
industry-independent data gathered in the last
four or five decades confirm this dismal picture.
Commercially important, C. virgi.nica has
provided the resource-base of considerable Chesapeake economic activity for over two centuries.
For much of that time, it was primarily selfsustaining: It was a self-renewing (but diminishing as harvesting increased) resource, requiring
little or no direct maintenance. Such a potentially
limitless "gold mine" deserved careful
husbanding. It did not get it! It could have
continued to produce year after year at very little
cost, but did not.
The public oyster grounds of Virginia (commonly called the Baylor Survey Grounds, or
Baylor Grounds, though additions have been made
to them since Lt. J. B. Baylor published the results

of his landmark survey in 1894) have been the
source of most commercial oyster production in
the commonwealth. Whether harvested by public
oystermen or replanted and grown by private
oyster planters, over 90 % of all market oysters
taken and sold throughout history have come
directly as marketable adults or as seed from the
oyster reefs of the public grounds. The same is
true of yields from public grounds in Maryland,
whose boundaries were established by a series of
surveys conducted in the early 1900s and reported
by C. C. Yates (1913). Though recorded production
of market oysters from the public oyster reefs of
Maryland's upper Bay and tributaries (including
the Potomac River) had begun to drop some 25
years before the Yates surveys, while Virginia's
had yet to peak, oyster populations in the Bay had
already displayed signs of overharvest as larger
individuals disappeared from catches and catchper-unit-effort decreased on exploited reefs

(Stevenson 1894).
Over the last two centuries the once-massive
Chesapeake reefs and the self-renewing populations of living oysters they produced year in and
year out provided local oyster harvesters with
marketable edible animals. They also provided
oystermen with seed to be sold to private planters
who, on bottoms leased from the public, produced
market oysters. Out-of-state harvesters and
buyers, sometimes as many as 2,000 or more
dredge and buy boats, removed millions of bushels
of market and seed oysters as well. Many were not
reported or recorded. These same oyster reefs
supplied uncounted millions of tons of shells for
use in road building (whole shells), chemical
processing, construction and agriculture (ground
and burnt lime) and poultry husbandry (shell grit).
In both states the public oyster grounds and the
oysters they produce belong, ultimately, to all
citizens and their posterity. As well, the large
majority of grounds leased by private planters (far
fewer in Maryland than in Virginia) belong initially and ultimately to the general citizenry. Thus,
harvesters and leaseholders alike have been and
are dependent upon the public largesse. This
cogent point was made quite strongly by Virginia's
conservative and arguably most powerful nonColonial governor, Harry Flood Byrd, who, in a.
communication to the General Assembly over 65
years ago said; " ... certainly the people of Virginia
as a whole have a right to demand that this great
State asset not be made the football of unreasoning
560
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1994, Hargis and Haven unpublished reports,
and many others) .
An example of this mindset or attitude was
provided in the Commentary section of the Bay
Journal recently by two state officials, who argued
that the cause of the oyster decline was disease and
not management (Jensen and Travelstead 1992). In
doing so both, who are fisheries managers for
Maryland and Virginia, respectively, were either
operating from an extremely narrow viewpoint, or
using a carefully contrived interpretive "strawman"
not obvious to readers, or they were misinformed or
mistaken. Whichever the case they seem to have
ignored or glossed over several important and
highly pertinent details in preparing their commentary. The most important of them is that recorded
market oyster harvests from Maryland's public
oyster grounds have been in a general state of
decline since 1884-85 (figures 1 and 2), followed by
those of Virginia, which have dropped since 1904
(figures 2, 3, and 4). Also, and unfortunately for
their argument, the two prominent causative agents
of disease among Chesapeake oyster populations
Perkinsus marinus, widely accepted as the cause of
Dermo disease, and Haplosporidium nelsoni, related to
MSX disease, did not cause numerically or economically significant mortalities in the general oyster
population of Maryland waters until around harvest
year 1981-82, some 100 years after recorded market
oyster harvests had begun their long decline (figure
1). Though some oyster populations in Virginia's
lower Bay, with its higher salinities, experienced
"significant" oyster mortalities attributed to MSX some
20 years earlier than Maryland (Dermo was already
present in some Virginia oyster populations and had
presumably been "accommodated to" by affected
public oyster populations), the decline in recorded
harvests had begun at least SO years before notable
mortalities attributed to either disease were reported.
Clearly, despite the arguments of these two fishery
managers of the Chesapeake Bay states (and of some
industry representatives or apologists) to the contrary,
disease has not been the cause of the long-term decline
of Bay "natural" oyster populations, as reflected in the
recorded market oyster harvests from public grounds in
either state. Also, they apparently chose to ignore two
important fishery management facts:
(1) harvesters should be allowed to harvest no
more target individuals of any population than
that population can replace under the ecological
circumstances pertaining, and
(2) mortality by disease or any other cause must be
factored into the equations used to establish
harvest limits or quotas.

prejudice either on the part of the planters or of the
tongers and to the short-sighted policy of ruthless
extinction." (Byrd 1928)
Unfortunately, users and public managers
continued to ignore this important fact and behaved as though only the harvesters, buyers,
planters, processors, and s1~llers had rights to the
resource and to the proceeds and ecological benefits
therefrom and the potential thereof. They still do! This
narrow operational viewpoint has never been biologically, morally, or legally justified. It is not now and
should be abandoned! The people's (and posterity's)
rights as owners should figw-e prominently in the
management process. They are the stockholders, the
owners, of the resource base.
As the record shows, managers and harvesters alike
also have ignored the universal truth that no economically valuable public, common-property, biological
resource can withstand continual, inadequately
controlled harvesting for long. Several once plentiful
Chesapeake marine/ estuarine fishery resources have
been harvested to or beyond the brink of economic
extinction. Perhaps the most notable are the two
sturgeons now ranked as thr1~atened species (Adpenser
brevirostrum and A. oxyrhynchus), the sheepshead
(Archosargus probatocephalus) and the American shad
(Alosa sapidissima): Others show signs of growing
troubles (White, 1982). The striped bass (Marone
saxatilis) almost made the list of economically extinct
finfishes several years ago. Fortunately, severe reduction of commercial and sport harvesting forced by
the Atlantic States Marine Pisheries Commission and
the federal government, allowed its recovery.
Control of fishing pressure on the striped bass
enhanced its relatively rapid recovery. This success
story should provide a clear example of the benefits
of harvest control.
The Chesapeake oyster population has held out
against relatively increasing harvesting pressures
longer than most species. It has sustained over harvest for well over a century ,but the apparently
inevitable economic demise of the Chesapeake's
"golden goose" seems about to happen.
Evidence that the public oyster resource, once
deemed inexhaustible by many, is about to succumb to "play out", is exceedingly strong. Unfortunately,
some public managers and industry representatives
remain unwilling to recognize this situation publicly.
Even more are unwilling to accept the primary, longterm causes - overharvesting and the habitat (oyster
reef) destruction associated therewith - so well
established by a number of socioeconomic and scientific
studies (Stevenson 1894, Moore 1910, Loosanoff 1932,
Kennedy and Breisch 1983, Rothschild et al.
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Data from Md. Dept. Nat. Res.
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Figure 1. Maryland market oyster production by harvest season (public and private). Maryland oysterman
have sucessfully fought leasing throughout the years. Less than 10,000 acres are under lease. Private production has been
and is significant. Bars represent public harvests, essentially.
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A few management (and industry) apologists
have even argued that reports of dwindling
market oyster harvests are not actually indicative
of dwindling populations of oysters on public
bottoms, claiming that there are as many individual oysters in the Chesapeake now as there
ever were. But this claim is patently ridiculous.
Numbers of adult, market-sized oysters (whether
2 1/2" or 3" in maximum shell dimension) are
down in both states at this writing. Were they not
more would have been caught by experienced
harvesters actively seeking these size groups. But
catch of market oysters per unit effort has been
dropping. This means that numbers of larger,
more fecund individuals in the remaining populations are down. As well, the overall reduction of
brood stock undoubtedly caused reduction in
larvae, spatfall, and adults - a snowballing effect.
Further, functional sex ratios may have been altered by
constant removal of larger individuals because C.
virginica is reported to be a protandrous hermaphrodite
(i.e., male when younger and smaller and female when
older and larger). In fact, overall populations of larger,
market-sized, and the younger and smaller individuals
called "smalls" by some are severely reduced in most
places. Spatfall is down as well in many systems.
Probably the most serious long-term consequence of
overharvesting has been habitat destruction. The
Chesapeake oyster's "favored" habitat, the oyster reefs,
has been reduced. In both states, most once-massive,
up-thrusting, surface-breaching oyster reefs are mere
hillocks or ''bumps" on the bottom. In fact, many
formerly prominent reefs, "planed- or nibbled-away"
by decades of harvesting by dredge and tong, have
become silted over and can no longer sustain appreciable numbers of living oysters. Some vanishing reefs
are well below the surface of the bottoms and can no
longer "catch" setting-stage larvae or even be located
without probing or echo sounding. Destruction of the
reefs has been a disaster of the first magnitude since
with them went the survivability of the self-renewing
populations that sustained the reefs, themselves, and
the depredations of industry. See table 1.

though production is now almost nonexistent comparatively. This report deals with the public
oyster resources and the industry dependent
thereon! Reference to private planting is only
supplemental. Background information has been
gleaned from a review of pertinent historical or
scientific literature and from personal experiences
of some 40 years each as marine scientists, fisheries
advisers, and consultants. Additionally, one of us
(Hargis) served as a fisheries manager.
For numerical data, we must rely heavily on
available records of market oyster harvests to
indicate the long-term status of the natural, selfrenewing populations of the resource. We realize
that such data are fishery-dependent and may
contain certain industry-related biases. However,
significant fishery-independent data have not been
available until relatively recently.
Historical accounts contain the only quantitative data available for the early period. Harvest
records collected by the state and federal government cover much of the present century. Together,
they provide the only long-term numerical indicators. Whatever their shortcomings, recorded
harvests are generally reflective of the state of the
resource during the period of harvest in most years
and are useful in establishing and identifying
trends. Relative comparisons made therefrom are
considered meaningful (Christy 1964, Kennedy and
Breisch 1983). It is no accident that recent, industryindependent, objective estimates of current population
levels of James River seed area populations are down
(Haven et al. 1978, Hargis and Haven 1988a, Roger
Mann, personal communication).
At least one Chesapeake fishery manager has
recently opined publicly that the estimates of
harvests in Maryland in the period prior to 1900 or
so were high, apparently inferring thereby that the
declines shown by the data for Maryland (figure 1)
have not been as significant as they appear and
that the effects of overharvesting in the late 1800s
and early 1900s were not as severe as some have
claimed. However, many fishery statisticians and
scientists have concluded that recorded Chesapeake oyster harvests actually have been underreported and are, therefore, conservative probably highly so. Our experiences and studies
confirm this conclusion (Haven et al. 1978). The
reasons for these conclusions are simple. Reporting has been largely voluntary and based upon
industry-generated and provided numbers with
little verification. Throughout most of the history
of the fishery, most harvester /buyer transactions
have been in cash, the monitoring of which is

RECORDED MARKET OYSTER CATCHES:
THE BASIS OF THIS ANALYSIS

This study, designed to determine what went
awry, is focused upon the natural, formerly selfrenewing oyster populations residing upon the
public oyster reefs of Chesapeake Bay. They have
been the basis of most public market oyster
production in the Chesapeake and still are, even
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MARKET OYSTERS 1
(With culling, No culling
exacerbates damaging effects)

SEED OYSTERS 1
(Mo culling)

OYSTER SHELLS 2
(Reduces, self-renewing capacity of
reefs)

Removal of shell from target reef
reduces shall surface available
for apatfall.

Removes larger, older mature
oysters, reducing brood stock
and overall fecundity and
lowering recruitment.

Removes young, leaving

Often kills attached spat

Removes attached spat.

Removes attached spat.

Removes attached market
oysters.

Eventually reduces number of
living oysters the reef can

fewer to grow to adulthood
and breeding or market
size. Lowers fecundity.

Reduces overall population
D•"hah1y

a1~ara aow

ra~lna

of remaining populations toward
younger, smaller males by •selective•
removal" of larger, older females

support.

Removes faster-growing, surviving
individuals thus reducing genetic
quality of surviving populations

Reduces overall population.

Reduces reefs in height,
extent, volume and surface area damaging or destroying habitat.

Setting la bettar on reefs with living
oysters. Reduction of living oysters
can, therefore, reduce apatfall.

Removes shell. Also,
reduces shell replacement
ability of reef.

Reduces reefs in height,
extent, volume and surface
area, damaging habitat

Reduces reefa in height,

Diminution of reefs puts remaining
shells and.surviving and future
oystara closer to bottom, thus
increaaing stress, availability to
predators and chance• of damage to
remaining living oyatera and of reef,

Removes larger shell-producing adults,
damaging self-maintenance ability of
entire reef.

Reduces filtering capacity
of reef population and

Reduces filtering capacity of reef
population thereby reducing
filtration - associated ecological
effects.

Reduces reef's
attractiveness to finfish.

extent, volume and surface
area damaging or destroying
habitat.

altering filtration-

ltaelf, by siltation and sanding.
Reduced reef's attractiveness of reef
flnfiah and its carrying capacity
for same.

associated ecological
effects.
Allows depleted reefs to silt over.

and their carrying capacity
for same.

Reduces reef's attractiveness of
to finfish and their
carrying capacity for same.

1

Harvest avoid culling whenever possible. They also avoid sulling in areas being harvested to reduce chances of relifting same shells and other
rejects. In either caces, reefs being harvested are reduced. Reduction of reefs alters biogeophysical properties of reefs and fields.

Though purposeful removal of shells themselves for use in road building, lime production, and poultry grit, once commonplace, is no longer officially
permitted, shells continue to be removed by harvesting of mature and seed oysters, and the shell-replacement capabilities of oyster beds are reduced.

2

Table 1. Effects of overharvesting on oyster populations and oyster reefs.
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impossible. Because of the state and federal tax
implications of numerical catch data, at-landing
purchases, or even records of processed products,
and the desire of many industry participants to
minimize accountable transactions and tax liabilities, the likelihood that data regarding harvests
and buyer purchases have been anything other
than the lowest and most conservative possible is
vanishingly small. This conclusion was verified
most recently when a leading upper-Bay
waterman was reported to have insisted publicly
that the low 1993-94 Maryland market oyster
harvest of only 75,633 Md. bu. was deliberately
underreported by fellow harvesters.
Some contend that dwindling market demand for
oysters, and not declining oyster resources, has been
responsible for part of the downturn in market oyster
harvests in the Chesapeake region over the years. 1his
argument is specious. Extensive industry records and
related studies show that regional and national demand
did not decline through most of the last 150 years, even
while harvests of public oysters in the northeastern and
mid-Atlantic states and in the Cllesapeake region
dropped. Historically, increasing national demand
forced northern harvesters southward in the quest for
new resources to pillage during the early 1800s
(Ingersoll 1881, Stevenson, 1894). Further, all along the
Atlantic coast of the United States, continuing demand
spurred "artificial" culture of oysters after local selfrenewing populations on public oyster reefs had been
"mined out." In some eastern states ostreiculture
increases. Even now (fall 1994), when demand for
oysters in the United States actually appears to be
declining owing to changing tastes, unfavorable
publicity or other consumer-related factors, processors
in both Chesapeake Bay states import shucking
stocks and shucked oysters from other parts of the
United States to meet existing wholesale and retail
demands (while at the same time insisting that
Chesapeake public beds not be closed). Also, some
sales organizations in the United States are importing oysters from abroad. That diminishing demand
has not caused the long-term decline in Chesapeake
public oyster harvests can be safely assumed! The
recording agencies of the states and federal government
employ the slightly different reporting measures -the
Vuginia and Maryland bushels. Following their lead,
we do likewise. The difference is slight.
In summary, recorded data based upon harvests
are meaningful and useful for year-to-year comparisons of oyster harvests and of the approximate state
of the resource as most fishery scientists and managers have done. We are confident in their utility and
applicability to the objectives of this study.

The Chesapeake Public Oyster Resource: Its
Current Status
For most of the last 150 years or more, changes in
size-class composition and catch-per-unit of effort
(see Stevenson 1894, pp. 247, 287), and numbers of
market-sized individuals in the recorded commercial oyster harvests of the Chesapeake Bay states
show that oyster populations on the public oyster
reefs have declined. Evidence of this is powerful
and persuasive. Essential facts accounting for the
drastic reduction of public oyster resources in the
Chesapeake (in Maryland) have been available for
some time (Ingersoll 1881, Brooks 1891, 1905,
Stevenson 1894, Winslow 1881, 1882, 1884, Loosanoff
1932, and others).
As early as the late 1700s, public oyster resources in the Northeast had declined to such low
levels owing to overfishing that New Englandowned and based sail-powered oyster dredgers
invaded the Chesapeake Bay in large numbers. So
many appeared each year that Virginia, fearing
depletion of its oyster resources (especially by
"foreigners"), banned harvest by dredges on its
public oyster reefs in 1811. Maryland did the same
in 1820. Later both states allowed resumption of
dredging with special restrictions on outsiders.
But by the time they did, many northern oyster
catchers and processors, shippers, and marketers
had established business relationships (genuine or
spurious) or local businesses in the Chesapeake
region to avoid the noncitizen ban. Many actually
moved to the Chesapeake after their northern
oyster businesses declined or failed. New England
surnames became common in Bay fisheries
(Stevenson 1894). Dredging continued apace.
1his north-to-south migration of the oyster industry
continued as New England, middle-Atlantic, and later
Cllesapeake oyster stocks were depleted. Publicly
based oystering operations have shifted ever southward along the western North Atlantic littoral. Oyster
populations in Atlantic states south of Virginia are
shrinking under the pressure.
The socioeconomic importance of the eastern,
or Virginia, oyster (C. virginica) to both Bay states
is well documented. Over the years, public news
media of the Chesapeake region have devoted
considerable attention to the oyster resource, its
management, its problems, and its future. In the
early part of this century, at least 33 editorials
treating the socioeconomic and political activities
related to oyster management appeared in the
Baltimore Sun within a 3-month period in the
spring of 1914 (Kennedy and Breisch 1983). This
566
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level of attention by that newspaper is understandable. The oyster was the ha.sis of many Chesapeake
financial fortunes and had sustained over 100,000
people Bay-wide. At that time, Baltimore was the
center of oyster processing and distribution in
Chesapeake Bay. It was the world leader. Of special
importance to the media was the drop in market
oyster production from the public oyster reefs
(mostly) of the upper Bay f:rom a reported peak of 15
to 16 million Md. bu. in 1884-85 to between 4 million
and 5 million Md. bu. in 1914 (figure 1). It was never
again to attain the highs of the 19th century.
In Virginia the Richmond News Leader published
a series of articles on the declining oyster resource
and the industry based thereon in 1930. These
articles were accumulated in a booklet (Corson
1930) by that influential newspaper in an attempt
to affect public policy concerning oyster management, which was under considerable scrutiny and
debate at the time (Byrd 1928). The News Leader's
series established clearly and convincingly
thatVirginia's public oyster resources had been
overutilized and the industry based thereon was in
decline well before the 1930s. Notably, reported
harvest declines in both states had occurred even
before toxic pollution, overfertilization, and
diseases were identified as significant problems in
the Chesapeake.

Populations of oysters on the fabled public
oyster-producing grounds of Maryland's upper
Chesapeake, as reflected by recorded market

somewhat from 1971 to 1982, as shown in figure 1.
By 1985-86 the annual catch was down to 1,557,091
Md. bu. In harvest year 1993-94 the recorded market
oyster harvest dropped abruptly to 75,633 Md. bu.,
47,985 bu (or 38.8%) less than the 124,618 bu recorded in 1992-93 and over 13 million Md. bu., or
99.5%, less than in 1884-85. In Maryland, as in
Virginia, these declines would have occurred earlier
and been more severe had not large influxes of
general fund and special fund dollars been spent on
the planting of millions of bushels of shells and
thousands of bushels of seed in attempts to maintain
production on the public reefs. It is difficult to
determine if actual rebuilding of the reefs and stocks
or merely maintenance of status quo in both was an
intended result of this repletion program because
harvesting was allowed almost as quickly as marketsized oysters appeared following plantings of shells
or seed. Certainly little rebuilding, probably none
on most reefs, resulted!
The public oyster bottoms of Maryland are
more extensive than Virginia's. At the time of the
Yates (1913) survey, they encompassed over
315,000 acres ("natural oyster bars" - 215,845
acres plus 100,000 "known productive" acres, p.
12) versus the some 211,000 acres for Virginia
identified by the Baylor Survey (Baylor 1894) in
Virginia. (As noted above, additions to the public
oyster grounds of Virginia have been made several
times since 1894, raising the total to the current
level of about 243,000 acres, including those on the
Seaside of the Eastern Shore. The same has
occurred in Maryland since 1913: Acreage has
been added to the original Yates survey.) Because
a larger percentage of the public oyster bottoms of

oyster harvests after 1885, dropped abruptly

Maryland were (a:::1d are) more suitable to the

through the remainder of the 19th century and into
the next (figure 1). After declines of over two-fold,
or one-half, to some 7,000,000 Md. bu. in 1895-96,
only 11 years after the peak of more than 15
million bushels in 1884-85 and between 4 million
and 5 million (a three-fold. reduction) in 1914,
harvests hovered at about 4,500,000 Md. bu.
around the early 1920s. Afterward, annual recorded harvests trended more gently downward,
with some variation, until 1965-66. By the1970-71
harvest year only 2.5 million bushels were reported. This approximate:ty six-fold drop from the
peak harvest of 1884-85 took place at least 10 years
before significant mortalities attributed to disease
appeared in Maryland oyster populations. As
figure 2 verifies, Maryland oyster landings, as
reflected by pounds of meats, maintained a
downward trend though they had flattened out

survival of oysters than those in Virginia's waters
owing to more favorable salinity distribution
related to the dominant freshwater contribution of
the Susquehanna drainage basin, the continuing
decline of market harvests in Maryland is even
more significant and the reason( s) for it more
difficult to understand.

Market Oyster Harvests from Maryland's Bay Waters

The Natural History of Public Market Oyster
Harvesting from Virginia's Waters

A larger portion of Virginia's some 199,000
acres of public oyster grounds in the Chesapeake
basin has been subject to occupation at various
times by screwborers (Urosalpinx cinerea and
Eupleura caudata), starfish (Asterias forbesi), and
other oyster-consuming predators than those of
Maryland. The same is true of the oyster diseases,
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MSX and Dermo. These and similar oyster enemies are normally kept from most of the public
oyster grounds of Maryland (and comparable
regions in Virginia) by the lower-salinity waters
usually prevalent there. But protection related to
low salinity breaks down when prolonged drought
visits the Chesapeake watershed, especially the
Piedmont and mountain regions of central New
York, Pennsylvania, Maryland, West Virginia, and
Virginia. Significantly lower precipitation there in
winter and early spring, reduces spring freshwater
inflows from the Susquehanna, Potomac, and
James Rivers. Subsequently, salinities of Bay and
tributary waters increase as higher-salinity ocean
water replacing diminishing freshwater flows
encroaches farther and farther up-Bay, upriver and
inland. Short dry spells and short wet spells have
been the rule in the Chesapeake region since
climatological records have been kept, but occasionally a long dry period occurs and salinities in
the Bay become higher, intrude farther up-Bay and
upriver, and remain there for longer periods. This
happened in the decade of the 1980s, and highsalinity waters favoring the two diseases (MSX and
Dermo) swept into areas in Maryland and Virginia
whose waters are normally of lower salinity. They
remained there for long periods. The two diseases
spread as well. (Whether their spread was aided
by movement of infected seed and adult oysters by
public or private planting activities is not clear, but
it could have been.) The oysters in those areas had
little or no previous experience with either disease
and resistance was low to nonexistent in affected
populations. Oyster populations in much of
Maryland and on many normally low salinity
oyster beds in Virginia were significantly affected
by disease-related deaths in the 1980s for the first
time since oyster harvests have been recorded.
Warmer-than-usual winters, which seem to favor
attacks of Dermo, also prevailed during much of
this period. Mortalities occurred and oyster stocks
and catches declined faster and further than by
overharvesting alone, but too many market oysters
continued to be removed from upper-Bay and
other lower-salinity reefs by oystermen. Overharvesting is relative to the ability of the target group
to sustain the removals made at the time of harvest, not some previous "happier," higher-productivity time. Disease is a natural factor that must be
considered in fishery management!
Total recorded market oyster harvests in
Virginia for schocked years from 1890 to 1970 are
depicted in figure 3. Total market oyster harvest
figures include production from both public reefs

and private beds. Reports before 1930-31 did not
distinguish between the two effectively. Though
private plantings occurred before the Baylor survey
was begun in 1892, oyster production before 1925 or
so was largely from the public reefs and, therefore,
mostly reflects the actual populations on the public
grounds whence they were drawn. As leasing grew,
private production contributed an increasing
proportion of the state's total market oyster production. It is difficult to distinguish exactly how much
market oyster production from public oyster reefs
and how much from private grounds for this period
from the data available to us to this point. Because
of this difficulty, we have included a line graph
representing the reported leased acreage along with
the total "catch" bars from harvest years 1901 to 1970
in figure 3. This allows a comparison between
acreage under lease, and presumably planted, and
total recorded harvest. Beginning in 1930-31, public
and private harvest records were separated and
regularly so reported. Therefore, catches from public
grounds for the years after 1930 are represented by
the hatched areas in figure 3. Those from private
leases are stippled. Even so, as the figure shows, not
only did harvests from public reefs decline during
the period 1904 to 1930-31 but whatever increased
private planting occurred (here we presume that
increasing acreage under lease meant increased
private planting) was never able to compensate for
the long-term drop in populations on and catches
from public grounds during that time. Had it
compensated more effectively, the total harvest bars
(heavily outlined) would not have declined as they
did. Indeed, except for 1960, the trend of catches
from public grounds was definitely downward
during the period as it continued to be afterward.
Otherwise the total market oyster harvest record
during that period would have trended upward
instead of downward.
In harvest year 1930-31 (1930), when clear-cut
separation of harvests from public reefs and private
beds was effected (figure 4), the market oyster harvest
from the public grounds alone was down to about 1
millionVa. bushels from the peak of somewhat below
the total of 7.5 million Va. bu. reported in 1904. This was
at least a seven-fold, or about 87.0%, decrease. As figure
4 shows, the decline in public market oyster harvests
continued. throughout the entire 28-year period (1930 to
1958) before MSX was identified in oysters from higher
salinity portions of Virginia's lower Chesapeake system
in 1959-60.
After the 1960-61 harvest season, public market
oyster yields dropped still further to about 230,000
Va. bu. in 1961-62 and 280,000 in 1962-63. In 1964568
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65, they doubled to around 600,000 Va. bu. Thereafter, with fluctuations (probably caused by
development of disease resistance to MSX in the
populations, or changes in distribution and effectiveness of MSX associated with changes in salinity
patterns, or both) market oyster harvests from public
oyster reefs continued fairly significant (ranging
from about 200,000 to 700,000 Va. bu) but drifted
downward until they flattened out at around 300,000
Va. bu. in 1982-83 and remained there through 198586, the year that populatiom and market oyster from
harvests outside the James "crashed."
In the 1986-87 harvest year, Virginia's public
market oyster catches increased markedly to
501,075 Va. bu. But this upward swing did not
mean that harvestable numbers of market-sized
individuals had increased :in the populations
surviving on the public oyster grounds of Virginia.
To the contrary, harvestable market oyster populations on public grounds elsewhere in Virginia's
Chesapeake waters (or wherever Virginia oystermen
usually worked, including those of the Potomac
River) had dropped to reco::-d lows! As a result,
remaining oystermen from all over Virginia descended upon the only still-·productive public oyster

reefs of Virginia - the seed oyster grounds of the
upper James estuary above Wreck Shoals. Consisting of about 3,500 acres of actively-producing oyster
reefs out of a total of some 28,000 acres in the entire
James system and 199,000 public acres in the entire
lower Chesapeake, the "former" seed area produced
342,784 Va. bu of market oysters (obligingly redefined downward at that time for the convenience of
the oyster harvesters by VMRC from 3 inches to
21/2 inches maximum shell dimension) in 1986-87.
For the first time the principal "seed" area of
Virginia produced more market oysters than seed
and more than all other public reefs. All of the rest
of the Baylor Grour.ds in the Chesapeake (some
196,000 acres) produced only 158,291 Va. bu (or 32%
of the total) in that year. In 1987-88 ,even more
oystermen came to the former James River seed reefs
in search of market-·sized oysters but, despite the
increase in effort (from 15,754 boat days in 1986-87 to
21,305 in 1987-88), the total market oyster harvest
already had begun to drop (to about 297,774 Va. bu
in 1987-88) and continued to do so for the next 4
years. This sequence is well illustrated in figure 5.
When increased effort produces smaller catches
from an otherwise reasonably stable population,
overharvesting is the cause.
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In 1991, Hargis and Haven (unpublished report)
recommended to the Virginia Blue Ribbon Oyster Panel
that the Virginia Marine Resources Commission
(VMRC) be advised to consider cessation of James
River seed area market oyster harvests. But, harvesting
pressure on producing reefs was not effectively controlled and the drop continued. Concerned over this
disastrous situation, fishery management specialists
and scientists from both VMRC and the Virginia
Institute of Marine Science {VTh,fS) urged complete
closure of the public oyster reefs of the James River seed
reefs to market oyster harvesting in the fall of 1993 to
conserve brood stocks. (Paradoxically, seed harvests,
removal of small young oysters from the surviving
population, were to be allowed to continue). At first,
VMRC commissioners agreed and halted market-oyster
harvests for almost two months. Unfortunately,
pressured by oystermen and their allies and apologists,
the Commission reopened the beds to market-oyster
harvesting in late February of the 1993-94 harvest
season. In harvest year 1993-94, market oyster catches
from the James' reefs dropped to a record low. (Only a
small part, if any, of this reduced harvest can be
attributed to the closure during the "deep winter"
months of January and February of 1994.) Market
oyster production by the James River public seed beds
had all but ceased and those few that were caught were
hard to sell as "markets." Total Chesapeake Baylor
(public) Grounds market oyster production for the
period 1993-94 was 5,484 Va. bu! The James River seed
area had produced 5,173, or almost 95%, of that. The
other 196,000 acres of Baylor grounds in all of the rest of
Virginia's Chesapeake produced only 311 Va. bu!
(Similarly, the entire Potomac River yielded only 230
Md. bu. and VA buin 1993-94, versus 74,591 in 1992-93
and many more earlier.) It is crystal clear from these
data that the James, once the source of most seed
planted by private growers, could no longer provide
significant quantities of seed were it called upon to do
so and probably will not be able to do so for many
years.
But, as indicated above, declining market oyster
production by the public (Baylor) grounds was not a
recent phenomenon. It had been occurring for almost a
century. The best example of this is provided by the
James River estuary, which contained historically the
most productive acreage of public bottom in Virginia.
In fact, James River oyster reefs, in the market oyster
area (i.e. , below Wreck Shoals) were showing clear
signs of depletion (Ingersoll, 1881) well before Dr. H.F.
Moore's quantitative survey of 1909. The same was
true for the reefs of the seed oyster area (except Wreck
Shoals which apparently showed few signs of depletion
at that ti.me) (Moore 1910). Unfortunately, populations

on all James River market and seed reefs dropped still
further during the next 20 years and by 1930 even
Wreck Shoals reefs were being depleted (Loosanoff
1932). Marshall (1954) and Hargis (1966) noted additional declines in James River reef topography and
structure during the next 20 and 35 years after
Loosanoff's report, respectively. Haven et al. (1981)
found more signs of damage (and associated population reductions) to the James River market and seed
oyster reefs. DeAlteris (1988) quantified damage to the
Wreck Shoals reef. Bailey (1941) reported similar
declines of public reefs in the York River.
Clearly, the majority of Virginia's Chesapeake Bay
public oyster reefs have been overharvested throughout
the 20th century, and even before. Today, all are
reduced, many are essentially depleted. Fortunately,
the 196,000 public grounds outside of the James have
been closed by VMRC for about two months at this
writing. We wonder how long this closure will continue after semblances of harvestable stocks return.
Oudging from past management performance, it won't
be for long.) Unfortunately, the James seed area
remains open to market and seed oyster harvesting.
The complex relationships between overharvesting, depletion, and degradation of living
populations and habitat (reef) destruction are
depicted in table 1.

A Brief Review of Management Efforts on
the Chesapeake
Kennedy and Breisch (1981 and 1983) presented the
history of oyster management efforts in Maryland and
provided a critical analysis of the results those management efforts produced or, rather, failed to produce.
Their 1983 report, "Sixteen Decades of Politi.cal Management of the Oyster Fishery of Maryland's Chesapeake Bay," is the best overall review and evaluation of
the problem that has been produced in this century.
Rothschild et al. revisited this subject in 1994. Their
findings largely reinforce those of Kennedy and Breisch.
Unfortunately, Rothschild et al. (1994) opined that hand
tongs, not being as destructive as dredges, had not been
involved in the reef reductions. In this conclusion, they
were mistaken. With few exceptions shaft tongs have
been the principal gear allowed on the public reefs of
Virginia and on those in county waters in Maryland
during this century. They have been the only harvesting tools allowed on the James seed reefs in recent
times. Though shaft (hand) tongs require direct
muscle power and may take longer than powered
scrapes (light dredges), dredges, or patent tongs,
depending of course upon the numbers engaged at any
one time, they can and do destroy reef structure.
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The most comprehensive study of the Virginia
oyster resource, the industry it supported and the
management efforts directed at continuing the
resource and preserving industry was conducted
during the mid-1970s. The results appeared in an
extensive report by Haven et al. (1978). Sequels
were published by Hargis and Haven (1988a and
1988b).
The reports of Kennedy and Breisch (1981 and
1983), Rothschild et al. (1994), Haven et al. (1978),
and Hargis and Haven (1988a and 1988 b) can be
consulted for full details of those studies. All
provide information useful in the evaluation of the
effectiveness of Chesapeake Region public oyster
fishery management. It is not necessary to review
their findings here, but sufficient to assert that the
major conclusions reached therein were adequately
supported and justified by the available data and
related information cited.

there. This restriction applied until just recently
when dredging by sailboats assisted by their "yawl
boats" (motorized push-boats) was permitted for
two days a week? By this action, a concession to
sailing oyster harv,~sters, power dredging was
restored to Maryla:~d- essentially. Soon, some
skipjack captains and crews dredged mostly on
"push-boat" days. Total state market oyster
harvests, and probably catch-per-boat, declined
throughout. The dredge-boat fleet dwindles apace.
Clearly, restrictive management efforts had not
worked in either state or on the Potomac River! Public
market oyster production continued downward and
the condition of the public oyster reefs worsened even
though restrictive regulations increased and police
forces were strengthened. Unfortunately, actual
harvesting pressure was never effectively controlled.
Thus, legislative and regulatory aspects of the voluminous and complex, often ad hoc, management programs of both states had clearly failed.

Management by Legislati've and/or Executive
Regulation -Generally Restrictive and Protective
in Intent

Concern for the structural and functional
condition and the biologic.:11 and economic productivity of the public oyster grounds (reefs) of the
Chesapeake owing to increasing harvesting
activities was expressed in the early 1800s. It was
manifested early on by the 1811 prohibition of
harvesting of oysters from the public grounds by
dredges in Virginia. This protective legislative
enactment by the Virginia General Assembly was
followed by many more ir. the next 180 plus years.
The legislature of Maryland has been active as
well, possibly more so than that of Virginia. It, too,
banned dredging in 1920. Oyster police were
established in both states after the Civil War. At
times machine guns, even cannon, were employed
in enforcement attempts. Cull laws were established, as were closed seasons (Everstine 1946,
Haven et al. 1978, Kennedy and Breisch 1983).
Dredges were reinstated a:nd then limited in both
states. In 1879, Virginia again banished dredges
from its public reefs (Ingersoll 1881) but allowed
its citizens to employ them in the mainstem of the
Potomac River. In 1933, issuance of eight Potomac
dredging licenses to Virginia oystermen was
reported in the annual report of the Virginia
Fisheries Commission. In 1934 and succeeding
years, none were reported. Hand scrapes continued in use on the Potomac: illegally and then
legally. Maryland restricted oyster dredges to Bay
reefs and allowed only sail as the motive power

Employment of Ostreiculture as a Means of
Replacing Lost Natural Production or Augmenting
Production on Public Oyster Reefs

Repeatedly, as human populations have overwhelmed local nahiral food supplies, "artificial"
monoculture has been promoted. Such has happened to the Eastern oyster (C. virginica ). As natural,
self-renewing production on public oyster reefs
declined under the harvester's onslaught thoughts
of scientists, public managers and some oystermen
turned toward replacement by, "forced" culture
using techniques already practiced elsewhere. New
England oystermen sought seed oysters from New
Jersey and Chesapeake waters to "bed" or "plant" at
home as early as 1808, probably before (Stevenson
1894). Oyster populations in their own public
waters had begun to fail before then and meeting the
rising national demand for oysters required more
than could be harvested locally.
Exactly when c:rude ostreiculture (and, as
generally practiced, it remains crude) began in the
Chesapeake may never be known but its occurrence was officially recognized in 1830 by passage
of the One-Acre Planting Law in Maryland.
· Publicly sanctioned "private" oyster culture using
state-owned bottoms had begun.
It did not take long for Maryland's watermen to
decide that private oyster culture was not in their
best interests. Their long political struggle against
private planting began. Recurring skirmishes
between public and private oystermen erupted
into open political warfare. Gunfire was ex571
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changed occasionally (Wennersten 1981). Opposition by public oystermen and their supporters to
private leasing resulted in a decisive defeat of
advocates of private ostreiculture in Maryland
(Kennedy and Breisch 1983), even though federal
and state fishery scientists and managers had
strongly urged expansion of the practice in several
major reports and two popular books (Brooks
1891, 1905, Stevenson 1894, Winslow 1884, Yates
1913 ,and others). During the latter phase of the
battle the Baltimore Sun also promoted state
encouragement of private culture in 1905 and 1906.
Over the next several decades, political maneuvering by and on behalf of Maryland public
oystermen effectively forestalled development of
private ostreiculture in Maryland's public waters.
For all practical purposes, it was frozen (Kennedy
and Breisch 1983). Private planting in Maryland's
waters remains minuscule, occupying about 9,000
leased acres. At times, state officials have opposed
private planting. Some still do.

is nowhere demonstrated quite so clearly as in the
public versus private culture debate and in the
securing and perpetuation of sizeable public subsidies for themselves. Undoubtedly, many Tidewater
politicians earned local approbation thereby.
In Virginia the negative response by public
oystermen to general urgings of private culture was
less vehement or, more likely, had a lesser effect than
in Maryland on legislative and executive action that
was more positively attuned to private enterprise.
Despite strenuous opposition from oyster tongers,
the commonwealth supported the developing
private planting effort more forcefully than Maryland and leasing expanded. Virginia businessmen
and watermen began occupying state bottoms as
early as 1865 in Chincoteague Bay. The practice
spread. Confusion resulting from their
unsanctioned activities lead to the Baylor Survey in
1892 (reported in Baylor 1894). Even before the
survey was reported and officially adopted, "private
planting" was already under way. In fact, occupa-

Judging by what actually transpired afterward,

tion of state-owned bottoms by private planters

the public oystermen's objections to private
ostreiculture were not directed toward the culture
part of the equation but to the private portion.
Maryland's watermen were quite willing to have the
state undertake ostreiculture - on their behalf. As
natural production from the public oyster reefs
continued to decline (despite cull laws, shell reservations, size limits, closed periods, legislated inefficiency of harvesting methods, and all other protective laws and regulations), the state of Maryland
itself undertook programs of public oyster reef
repletion under a law passed in 1924. Over time
Maryland's repletion program became quite extensive. At first it was financed by a gas tax on work
boats and direct appropriations from the state
general fund. Later, other oyster-related taxes were
involved but general fund subsidies were often
predominant, as they are today. (According to
Maryland Department of Natural Resources data,
from 1980 to 1991, almost 60 years after the first
repletion law was enacted, direct-cost expenditures
for public grounds repletion activities averaged over
$1.7 million per year.) Maryland's oystermen not
only benefitted from naturally produced populations on the public's oyster grounds, but harvests
from those grounds were augmented by shell and/
or seed plantings subsidized by revenues extracted
from the entire state citizenry. Maryland's citizens
had been taxed to maintain harvests from their own
resources and waters. From time to time, even
federal funds have been involved. The self-interested influence and power of Maryland's oystermen

(squatting) was largely responsible for the Baylor
survey. We do not know how many public acres
were illegally occupied by planters. But by 1899,
35,000 acres were reported by the Virginia Board of
Fisheries as being legally under private lease. The
number grew slowly to 40,400 acres in 1910, 48,014
in 1923, and 56,778 in 1925 (figure 3). For most of
this time, public grounds continued to outproduce
leased ones. The balance had reversed by the 193031 harvest season. During the period from 1931 to
1967, private leases doubled from 63,422 acres to
134,492 acres (Haven et al. 1978). Eventually,
market oyster harvests from private plantings
exceeded those from the public reefs by 3:1, or
more. This situation continued for over 45 years
but was again reversed in harvest year 1977-78.
Because most of the seed employed by the planters had come from the public reefs of the James
River, even the harvests from private plantings
have been based upon "natural" production of
Virginia's common property reefs.
Considering the public source of most seed
(and public ownership of the grounds leased at
low cost by private planters), it is obvious that
private ostreiculturists have been closely dependent upon the citizenry of Virginia for much of
their incomes from that activity. Because leases
have always been inexpensive, usually $1.50/ acre
or less, private planters have been directly subsidized by the general citizenry from the beginning
of private ostreiculture. Virginia's citizens have, in
reality, subsidized private planters indirectly by
572
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making large quantities of juvenile oysters (seed)
from public reefs available to public watermen to
harvest, generally at low cost compared to the
value of market-sized oysters, and sell to planters.
For many years, this seed oyster harvesting has
been a major factor in population declines and reef
destruction in the James River seed area.
Despite the rise of private planting in the
Virginia's lower Bay, the commonwealth, too,
began a program of state-operated oyster reef
replenishment in 1928 (four years after Maryland's
was officially enacted) to enable harvesting from
the public oyster reefs to continue (1928 Oyster
Repletion Act). The Virginia repletion program did
not amount to much until 1934-35, when 486,462 Va. bu.
of shells were planted, but in biological year 1974-75
became truly significant when it reached 3,481,727 bu.
The total shell planted on Chesapeake Bay public reefs
from 1962-63 to 1992-93 was about 53.5 million Va. bu.,
averaging about 1.8 million bu. per year. Significant
quantities of seed, also from the public beds, were being
planted on public reefs by the early 1970s. From 196263 to 1992-93, 2.13 million Va. bu. of seed were planted
(an average of 71,000 bu./yr). Had shell and seed
plantings not been made during the last 65 years,
harvests from the public oyster reefs of Virginia would
have dwindled and almost d:sappeared much earlier
than they did. In Virginia, as in Maryland, harvests
from public oyster reefs have been substantially
supported by the taxpayer-at-large (general fund
monies) or by funds from other nonfishery-related
sources such as revenues from state-granted rights of
way through and over state-owned bottoms, both fresh
and estuarine. In the long run, however, publiclysubsidized ostreiculture of Baylor Grounds bottoms
did not rebuild or even sustain the public oyster reefs or
their dwindling oyster popu1ations in Virginia!

many studies of the oyster and oyster industry
conducted by special legislative and executive
study groups in Maryland, such as commissions,
special study groups, task forces, and similar bodies.
Special surveys and reviews conducted by the U.S.
Coast and Geodetic Survey, the U.S. Bureau of the
Census and the U.S. Bureau of Fisheries (now the
National Marine Fisheries Service) were mentioned, as
were those of business-sponsored groups such as the
Baltimore Association of Commerce (Fairbanks 1932).
Some dated to before 1880. Such efforts increased
throughout the 1900s. Some studies resulted in
legislation, executive reorganization, regulation, and
management plans. An early comprehensive management plan for the Maryland oyster resource and
fishery- dependent thereon was developed in 1943.
Five years later, Bowman (1948) pronounced it a failure,
and in that same year a long-range oyster management
plan was promoted (Hammer 1948). There have been
several since (Anonymous 1990), and recently a new
plan was announced in Maryland. Actual improvements produced by all this activity have been
rare and of little long-term effect (Everstine
1946, Kennedy and Breisch 1983).
The same has happened in Virginia (Haven et
al. 1978, Hargis and Haven 1988a and 1988b,
Anonymous 1989). The Virginia Chamber of
Commerce was active. Legislatively mandated
studies were conducted in 1928, 1936, 1951, 1961,
and 1967; And there were others. A number of
legislative and regulatory enactments aimed at
improving fisheries management resulted. At least
two studies of the Joint Legislative Audit and
Review Commission (JLARC), which might be
considered Virginia's equivalent of Congress'
General Accounting Office, have addressed oyster
management, at least in part. Recommendations
for improved oyster management were included in
each (Joint Legislative Audit and Review Commission 1977, 1984). Neither included the essential
element - effective management and control of
harvesting levels.
In 1991, another review group called the Virginia
Blue Ribbon Oyster Panel advanced yet another
plan for improvement of the oyster resource and
industry, which Vl\.1RC received in 1992. The most
recent study group, authorized by House Joint
Resolution 535 and called "The Virginia Delegation
to the Chesapeake Bay Commission on the Condition and Future Prospects of the Shellfish Industry in
Virginia" is now "sitting" (fall 1994). A truly
positive outcome is difficult to anticipate.
The Potomac River Fisheries Commission
(PRFC), the bistate (Maryland and Virginia)

Management-Related Studies
Questions of what has happened to the Chesapeake
public oyster resource, of what was the cause (or
causes) of its decline, have concerned fishery scientists,
fishery managers, and oystermen increasingly in the
last century. Lately, the public has become concerned.
Such questions have prompted dozens of oyster study
groups during this century. Even as this was written
several were in action around the Chesapeake. Usually
involving considerable debate, much of it either largely
inconsequential, incomplete, ill-informed, or individually self-serving, the work of these study groups has
resulted in few positive results.
In their second management report, Kennedy
and Breisch (1983) discussed details of some of the
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compact body that manages oysters in the
mainstem of the Potomac River estuary, has
sponsored oyster management studies as well
(Davis 1974). Little positive management activity
has resulted and Potomac oyster yields have
continued to decline.
In the works but not yet accepted is a joint, Bay-wide
management plan developed and advanced by the
Chesapeake Bay Commission, an interstate compact
body. The likelihood that it will produce truly improved management activity is problematical.
In summary, a plentitude of studies of problems of
oyster resources, the oyster industry, and public
management all ostensibly aimed at more effective
management of the Bay's oyster resources and revival
of the industry they sustained have yielded few
detectable positive results The few achieved were
usually too little and too late and short-lived! The
public resource and industry based thereon waned
despite them all. This trend will continue until harvest
efforts are properly matched to available populations
and recruitment and effectively controlled.

to contribute little to improved management of
public oyster resources. As do other human
endeavors, science experiences fads. Like others,
scientists move toward research topics which generate
funding, position, and prestige and away from those
that do not. Unfortunately, research popular with
proposal and report reviewers, editors and funding
agencies may contribute little to practical management
efforts in timely fashion - or even ultimately. Some
academic scientists eschew what they consider practical, or applied, science. Many do not like survey or
monitoring activities so necessary to effective "practical" research and management. Also, scientists and
scientific institutions, anxious to survive and/ or to
avoid entanglement in public controversy, as so often
happens in fishery science and advisory services,
choose more neutral research topics. Some fishery
scientists, growing tired and disenchanted with the
disdainful treatment afforded them by public bodies,
study committees, and industry groups, chose
other, less-irksome topics for advisory service
work or research.
In recent years, some Chesapeake monitoring and
survey programs appear to have weakened. Whether
because of a waning of interest, declining funds, or
deliberate attempts to downplay or disguise the
seriously depleted condition of the resource, support for
and conduct of careful monitoring of harvests, harvest
efforts, population levels, site-specific repletion activities
versus site-specific yields, spatfall, predation, disease,
and other important ecological factors seem to have
declined. They should be increased! Scientifically
sound and objective survey and monitoring data are
necessary for proper management. Management
agencies that do such work must make certain that the
conduct, results, and reports of that work are thorough,
objective (not deliberately organizationally self-serving),
publicly available, and incorporated into positive
management efforts as quickly as possible.
Over the past 115 years, findings and recommendations of science have been largely ignored. When
accepted, acceptance has been given grudgingly.
Brooks (1891,1905), Bowman (1940) and Kennedy and
Breisch (1983) have commented cogently on interactions between science, industry and/ or management. It
has been our experience that legislative and executive
commissions, committees, panels, and other study
groups usually accord scientists and scientific information short-shrift. In government, the call for and
funding of further "studies" often excuses the lack of
more positive, effective, and immediate action. Science
and scientific information have more often been
employed to delay decisions or cover for ineffective
management than to improve management. Sufficient

Scientific Understanding, Future Research,
and Management
The scientific literature on oysters is extensive.
The compilation by Breisch and Kennedy (1980) of
relevant world oyster literature listed some 3,781
publications. A great deal of that literature is
related to C. virginica and the industry it sustains.
Kennedy and Breisch (1981) incorporated a
substantial bibliography of some 725 relevant
publications in their first extensive review of
research and management of Maryland's oyster
resources. Much pertinent oyster research was
accomplished by scientists in Virginia (Hargis and
Armitage 1983, Wojcik and Hargis 1987). Undoubtedly, more is required but sufficient scientific
knowledge and acumen exist now to allow improvement of oyster resources and habitats in the
Chesapeake. They should be used even while
additional priority research is accomplished.
Improvement in management-related, scientific
research is needed. Of all the research that has
been accomplished little, has been devoted to the
overall oyster community, to oyster populations in
relation to their favored Chesapeake habitats, the
upthrusting reefs. This astonishing lack should be
remedied as quickly as possible. The reef rehabilitation programs now being planned or conducted
should incorporate careful ecological studies.
Recently, it has seemed to us that much oyster
research effort has been devoted to subjects likely
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scientific knowledge and acwnen exist to allow
improvement of oyster resources and habitats in the
Chesapeake now. They should be used!
In summary, more can be learned about the
oyster, its capabilities and requirements. Certain
avenues of monitoring and research remain to be
travelled and should be. Haven et al. (1978) and
Hargis and Haven (1988a) included specific
recommendations for both. However, sufficient is
known that public management can be improved,
beginning now! It is neither necessary nor justified
to delay positive action pending new knowledge.

tages are also detriments; because they are accessible and easily located and captured, oysters are
readily overharvest:ed.) All stages of the oyster's
life cycle are sufficiently understood as to allow
the animal to be manipulated with considerable
precision in laboratory and overboard experimental situations. In short, it is the most easily observed, taken, and manipulated of the major
estuarine fishery resources. If any commonproperty estuarine fishery resource is amenable to
effective management C. virginica is!
Failure to prevent overharvesting of such a
handy, hardy and r.1.alleable resource reflects a
major flaw in the capabilities of Virginia and
Maryland (and other Atlantic coast states whose
"natural," self-renewing oyster populations have
been all but obliterated) to manage their natural
marine/ estuarine fishery resources.
All living species are subject to the "rules" and
vagaries of nature. Those of substantial socioeconomic
import are strongly affected by pressures from humankind as well. In particular, species of economic significance, like C. virginica, are subject to direct and indirect
and intentional and unintentional human intervention
in their processes, habitats, and life-cycles. Additionally,
the economic and political activities of humans and
associated rules and regulations impinge upon them.
The welfare and future of many fishery organisms are,
in fact, at times more closely affected by human
activities than by natural events.
Chesapeake oysters are a case in point. The classical
signs of overfishing (removal of more individuals than
the population could replace naturally each year) had
begun to appear in the oyster catches and harvested
populations of the upper Chesapeake as early as 1840
or so with the disappearance of larger and older oysters
from the catch. Soon, more effort was applied but catchper-unit-effort dropped (Stevenson 1894). Afterward
harvests from natural and formerly self-renewing
public oyster reefs declined generally. Fluctuations,
sometimes large, in spatfall and survival of various
yearclasses (roughly, sizeclasses) continued, frequently
confusing the picture, but the downward trend in total
annual harvests from public oyster grounds persisted.
Generally, despite varying highs and lows in recorded
market oyster harve3ts, the highs were rarely as high as
formerly, while the lows trended downward as well.
Occasionally, as occurred in Maryland in 1840 ,when
beds containing unharvested, or underharvested, stocks
known only to few oystermen (or, less likely, to none)
were "discovered" in Tangier Sound, catches rose
sharply and continued to affect total recorded harvests
for some years thereafter (Kennedy and Breisch 1983).
(The unfortunate, but usual, side effect of such "wind-

DISCUSSION
Prompted by waning harvests and declining
natural populations of C. virginica in the Northeast,
several studies of local oyster stocks and the oyster
fisheries they sustained were undertaken in the
United States after the Civil War (Ingersoll 1881).
Attention quickly focused on the Chesapeake
region (Baylor 1894, Brooks 1891, 1905, Brooks et al.
1884, Stevenson, 1894, Winslow 1881, 1882, 1884).
These studies concluded that natural oyster
populations (on the public grounds or reefs) of
Maryland and Virginia we:re exhibiting signs of
overuse -overfishing. Obviously, burgeoning
public oyster resource problems were recognized
early. Remedies, some as cogent today as when
first made, were offered as early as the 1880s. Very
few were followed. Some that were tried even
worked and the rate of decline of catches and
stocks actually was reduced from time to time
(figures 1 and 4): Long-term decline continued.
Numerous studies conducted during this
century reinforced the results of those made earlier
(Moore 1910, Loosanoff 19.32, Haven et al. 1978,
Hargis and Haven 1988a,1988 b). They, too, made
corrective recommendations. Ultimately, however,
the underlying problems were not solved and
Chesapeake public oyster stocks and harvests
slumped further. Today they are, comparatively
speaking, nearly nonexistent.
Comprehending and accepting the precarious
state of the Chesapeake Bay oyster resource is
difficult, especially since C. virginica is a
territorialey limited animal, sessile as an adult and
one that had accumulated massive, self-renewing
populations in the Chesapeake by the time the
English settlers arrived. Further, this species
thrives best in shallow estuarine waters in large
groupings that are readily accessible. Also, oyster
beds are easily located physically, can be sampled
and evaluated. (Unfortunately, these same advan575
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fall" increases [including occasionally occurring
large spatfalls or temporarily improved survivalrates] was the easing of public pressures for improved
management.) Similar harvest increases also occurred
in Virginia from 1978-79 to 1983-84 in Tangier and
Pocomoke Sounds ,when dredges (scrapes), temporarily permitted on the public reefs there, made
populations hitherto beyond the reach of hand tongs
accessible (Whitcomb and Haven 1987). (See figure 4).
The same has happened in both states as patent tongs
were allowed on deepwater populations. Maryland
has even allowed harvesting by divers (as has the
PRFC), who can locate and hand pick the largest
survivors in comparatively deep waters. Not even
large "singles" oysters have been beyond capture in
some places. Despite such occurrences, the downward
trend was resumed once the new or more accessible
beds or yields from more efficient gear played out.
(Likewise, resumption of decline has followed both
record spatfalls and survival rates.)
Obviously,· the populations thus opened to exploitation and subsequently significantly reduced in numbers
of mature individuals were not as well able to contribute reproductive materials to the maintenance of their
own and nearby populations as before. Even the highly
fecund oyster has become so reduced in number and
altered in spatial distribution that optimum effective
reproduction was impaired. Long-term spatfall
declines in the formerly reliable James River seed area
are evidence of this. The many effects that overharvesting (overfishing) have on oyster populations and their
favored habitats, the naturally self-perpetuating oyster
reefs, are itemized in table 1.
Simultaneously with reductions in populations
(and sustainable harvest levels) the oyster reefs,
themselves declined in height, length, and width
(circumference), and surface area as "dead" shells
were removed along with the shells (and meats, or
soft bodies) of living oysters. As individual living
oysters were removed by harvesters, their shellproducing capabilities left with them. Present and
future cultch was mined away and the living
oysters that, if left in place, would have provided
fresh shells to continue reef "growth" and provide
new cultch when they died, were continually
reduced (Stevenson 1894, Moore 1910, Marshall
1954, Loosanoff 1932, and Hargis and Haven,
unpublished). At the same time the genetic
quality of the remaining populations was being
reduced. Stevenson noted these effects 100 years
ago when he wrote;"This decrease in the size of
the oysters is of more consequence than its effect
on the markets [the decline of the larger extra
select class of market oysters in harvests], [sic] or

on Maryland's prestige and a producer of superior grade oysters. It is a principal in the
economy of nature that a species should be
reproduced by the best developed and hardiest of
its kind. On this principle the progeny of a
colony of oysters not yet attained mature development can scarcely be expected to be so vigorous
and capable of combatting the many adverse
agencies to which these mollusks are subjected to
those of a well-stocked reef of large brood oysters." (Stevenson 1894). In short, the act of harvesting living oysters from the public reefs for market
and seed uses was also removing (mining) the
shell (cultch) needed to sustain the reef habitat and
the current and future oyster populations dependent upon it. Eventually, the rate of removal of
the living oysters, their shells and, more importantly, their shell-producing capabilities, became
greater than the capability of surviving living
oysters to replace the plundered, recently produced shell taken with them. To compensate for
overharvesting and removal of "fresh" shells,
"fossil" shells (themselves remnants of onceproductive oyster reefs) have been mined by shelldredging companies in both states to secure shell for
their own purposes and to supply, for a fee, shells
for the state oyster repletion programs.
Even as recorded catches decreased and other
signs of overharvesting manifested themselves, each
state increased activities designed to counter them
and preserve the resource and industry. They
enlisted the aid of federal fishery and survey
agencies. Many facts were discovered and numerous recommendations were advanced. The plethora
of restrictive legislation and regulation which
resulted (Everstine 1946, Kennedy and Breisch 1983)
probably stemmed from a sincere desire of responsible state fishery managers to achieve positive
results and equally sincere beliefs that enforcement
of those laws and regulations would bring such
results about. The same can be said of the efforts of
various individuals in each state who promoted
repletion programs to rehabilitate dwindling public
oyster reefs. Unfortunately, a greater and/ or more
politically influential number of individuals
strove to advance self-interests. Politicians sought
votes and oystermen and other industry participants promoted continued, preferably higher,
personal incomes. The public's resources and
interests suffered.
That the public oyster management effort
was failitng in Virginia and Maryland and that
truly effective countermeasures were required
should have been widely recognized and
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acknowledged well before World War II. But it
was not. Annual catches continued to decline,
as did the populations whence they were
drawn. Oyster reefs were further destroyed in
the process.
Science has long recognized that oyster reefs or
beds serve as focal points for many estuarine/
marine plants and animals of various taxonomic
groups and ecological habits. Such aggregations of
sessile organisms and their associates serve to attract
mobile animals of many species and habits, including grazers and predators such as spot (Leiostomus
xanthurus), croaker (Micropogonias undulatus) and
weakfish or gray trout (Cymscion regalis). They are
excellent natural, self-renewing, and self-maintaining fishing reefs. Thus, the Chesapeake's oyster
reefs have served both recrEational and commercial
fishing interests and, if restored or maintained and
effectively managed, can do so well into the future.
Allowing oyster reefs to be destroyed has further
injured the public's ownership rights and interests
by reducing these biogeomorphological features and
their value as fishing reefs on the public bottoms of
the Chesapeake.
Another and perhaps even more important
biologically and socioeconomically function of
oyster reefs when in their prime was to combine the
filtering power of the individual oyster by aggregation into large communal populations. It has been
calculated by Hargis and Haven (1988a) that 10,000
adult oysters located in a 50 ft2 area are capable of
filtering 713,390 gallons of water in a 24-hour period.
Independently, Newell (1988) found similar high
rates of filtration and concluded that the number of
oysters existing in the Chesapeake Bay in times

the public's ownership rights and ecological
interests damaged a.s overharvesting and concomitant reef destruction were not prevented.
Clearly, these findings of science should be
incorporated and applied as the public's interests
in restoration of oyster populations and their
habitat are being considered. Consequent improvements in finfishing, numbers and diversity
of biota, and, probably, a measure of pollution
reduction by more effective natural filtration will
be additional public "goods" or benefits. Because
these functions are interactive, survival of oysters
will be enhanced as well.
CONCLUSION

Even now, as Bay-wide public ground oyster
harvests have reached their nadir (hopefully), it
continues to be difficult, seemingly impossible, to
convince many oystermen and some state managers that overharvesting, habitat destruction, and
genetic-quality degradation associated with the
overharvesting of live oysters and shell (table 1),
are the principal long-term causes of the decline
of the public oyster resources of the Chesapeake
region. The reluctance of oystermen to accept this
reality is understandable. Obviously, the incomes
of those watermen still dependent in some
measure upon oysters from the public reefs are at
risk of further reduction if harvesting efforts are
restrained or eliminated by restrictive regulations
designed to conserve or rebuild stocks or habitat.
Closure of the few remaining Chesapeake reefs
continuing to produce market-sized oysters
would almost eliminate market harvesting in

before 1870 could potentiaily filter the entire volume

Virginia, however temporarily. The same is true

of the Bay in less than three days. He calculated that
by 1988 the population had been so diminished that
filtering the Bay would require between 244 and 325
days. In times before overuse reduced total numbers of individuals, and the size of their aggregations by destruction of reefs, this filtering capability
undoubtedly exerted considerable influence on
Chesapeake Bay waters by removing, processing
and partially sequestering silt and other particulates
from the nearby water during feeding. Ingested
material was digested and the unused remainder
egested as feces in mucous-bound strings. Rejected
material was bound in mucous and ejected as
pseudofeces. Much of this material (feces and
pseudofeces) contributed food and substrate to
bacteria, protozoans, annelids, and many other
species, thus enhancing tht:! biota and the food web.
This ecologically valuable ability was reduced and

of Maryland. Never mind that continuing declines in the resources will force those same
oystermen to seek other resources (assuming that
any are left in that finfish, soft clams, hard clams
and crabs are also heavily pressured common
property resources) or activities to replace the lost
income anyhow. To common property harvesters
an opportunity to make a catch deferred often
means an opportunity lost (Christy 1964). This
difficulty was also noted by Stevenson who
wrote: "The great trouble with the present
methods and regulations is not with the close
season or with the implements employed but. ..
the oystermen take no individual interest in the
preservation and development of the reefs on
which they work, their sole object being to obtain
at the moment all the oysters possible without
reference to the future supply. Individual inter577
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ests clash with the public good." (Stevenson 1894).
We agree with Stevenson (1894) and Loosanoff
(1932) and others who reached the same conclusions.
Given the socioeconomic realities, an individual
fisherman will fish "to the last" with little or no
regard to the future of the resource or of his future
livelihood, both of which are actually based upon
the long-term survival and well-being of that
resource. If he doesn't, the "other" harvester will
catch what he could have taken for himself.
Public oystermen cannot conserve the resource
themselves, and they have consistently resisted
management controls intended to do so in both
states and in the Potomac estuary.
The reluctance of crucial public managers to
recognize that harvest-related population reductions, genetic impairments, and habitat (reef)
destruction are responsible for the serious depletion
of Chesapeake public oyster resources is much more
difficult to rationalize or understand than that of
watermen. To be generous, one hopes it has come
from a sincere belief on the part of decision makers
that the scientific evidence that those phenomena
are indeed the cause of the harvest declines is too
weak to justify positive action. If so, they are
mistaken and have been for some time! In 1932 ,
Dr. Victor Loosanoff, the first marine scientist hired
by the Virginia Fisheries Commission, predecessor
of VMRC, reported to that body, "The rehabilitation of depleted grounds and the conservation of
the James River oyster industry can be accomplished only by adoption of measurescontrolling
the harmful effects of overfishing."(Loosanoff 1932)
Dr. Loosanoff's advice was not followed. Today less
than one-third of the public grounds in the James
estuary produce economic quantities of oysters.
Some state managers, even though recognizing that
problems exist, have sought to deny that the state
management systems are in any way responsible for
the long-term decline in oyster populations. They have
done so by contending publicly that disease and other
factors are primarily to blame Oensen and Travelstead
1992). Pollution is also regularly invoked by some as a
significant contributing cause. Those who blame these
factors seem to forget that sound fishery management
principles require that allowable harvesting levels of
public fishery resources must be related to the actual
condition of the stock and its ability to sustain those
harvesting levels. FuHillment of this requirement
demands that varying natural stresses such as mortalities owing to disease or predators, poor spatfall, or
other "background" causes, including pollution, be
factored into establishment of allowable harvest levels.
Management agencies that do not actively and hon-

estly attempt to do so can only be considered derelict or
incompetent. In truth, biologically justified allowable
harvest levels have rarely been established in management of Chesapeake shellfisheries - or even sought.
Data provided above show clearly that disease
caused by Dermo and MSX did not cause the longterm, downward trend of market oyster harvests
and the populations sustaining them! The decline
actually began and gained momentum long before
serious mortalities attributable to these diseases
were detected in the Chesapeake. Science and
state management may have helped reduce the
effects of disease and predation by recommending
or taking, respectively, various remedial actions,
but they have been unable to eliminate them.
But there is reason for hope. Oysters living on their
''healthy" oyster reefs survived disease and predation
before European settlement, otherwise the reefs and
populations they sustained would not have developed,
and can do so again provided they are assisted and
properly protected. Further evidence of the benefits of
upthrusting reefs is provided by scientists of Virginia
and Maryland, and others, who have shown that
C.. virgi.nica reared on off-bottom racks or trays can
survive to market size in the lower Chesapeake and
that they reach adulthood much more rapidly than on
the bottom. Hence, we strongly recommend rehabilitation of nature's off-bottom oyster culture systems - the
reefs (see below).
Pollution has not been responsible for the long-term
decline of public market oyster production in the
Chesapeake. We do not contend that toxic pollutants,
disease, or predation cannot affect oyster populations.
They can and do, but a great portion of the waters
around the truly productive public bottoms of the
Chesapeake are not toxic to oysters as yet. It is widely
known that oysters can survive in some types of nontoxic pollution such as raw and/ or properly-treated
poison-free sewage effluents and have done so for
decades in the Chesapeake. Of course, using oysters
from conderrmed areas for market purposes requires
relaying before sale for public health reasons, which
imposes an extra cost on harvesters who must catch the
oysters twice. Double harvesting adds to costs, but it is
not an insurmountable obstacle. Private planters have
done it regularly.
The best protection against the various types of
pollution is to bring them under positive control.
Honor-system water quality management is often
ineffectual and should be halted. State government is
primarily responsible for bringing sewage-related or
chemical pollution under control, and has been trying
to do so. However, its efforts clearly can and should be
increased and improved. In the meantime, public
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health agencies must continue compensate for the
effects of bacterial and toxics-related pollution by
judicious and justified closures and oyster managers by
reduced harvest quotas as and where necessary.
At this writing, it is worth noting that much has
been made in hearings and public pronouncements of
the numbers of acres of state bottoms under condemnation for health reasons and requiring relaying. It is not
enough to cry "pollution," however. That is too easy to
do and does not establish that a significant problem
really exists. One must actually know where actual
"damage" is occurring, and how much and what kinds
of pollutants are involved. Oddly, to our knowledge,
no one has troubled to determine exactly how many
acres of truly productive (formerly or presently) Baylor
(or Yates) bottoms are actually negatively affected by
such condemnations and closures. This should be
done. Many acres included witrun the Baylor or Yates
survey boundaries do not produce oysters and many
never have. In Virginia, most Baylor Grounds are in
rivers such as the Rappahannock River (about onequarter of all Chesapeake Bay public reefs), the
Piankatank River, the Bay, Tangier and Pocomoke
Sounds, the Bayside creeks of the Eastern Shore, and
other places that experience little pollution. Generally,
their oyster reefs are as depleted as those anywhere. In
some cases, they are worse.
As an example, the only economically productive
reefs in Vrrginia's lower Bay are those in the James
estuary. The James receives more treatment plant
effluents directly, and indireclly from its tributaries, than
any other Virginia estuary. But, as far as we are aware,
sites that contain significant levels of toxicants are few
and the zones of influence on "quality" Baylor bottoms
limited. The Elizabeth River :is an exception, but public
grounds there are small. Most natural oyster-growing
public areas in Maryland waters are little effected by
toxic pollution. The waters around Baltimore are an
exception. Like the Elizabeth, the Patapsco River is
contaminated. As for the productive natural oystergrowing areas of the Potomac (PRFC), most are
relatively clean. As with disease, we must conclude
that pollution has not been a principal long-term cause
of the decline of the oyster populations on productive
public oyster reefs.
The prime or root cause of the long-term
decline in public oyster populations and harvests
therefrom has been apparent for some time: The
legislative and/ or executive fishery management
systems responsible for "conservation" of oyster
resources (and the economic activities they sustain)
have proven incapable of doing so (Haven et al.
1978, Hargis and Haven, 1988a 1988 b, Kennedy
and Breisch 1983, Rothschi.ld et al. 1994). Un-

doubtedly, most state (and in earlier times, local)
government management agencies have been
staffed by sincere, well-meaning individuals, most
of whom undoubtedly believed, upon entering
employment or office, that improvement was
possible. It has not occurred! Making the existing
state fisheries management systems work effectively, as measured by sustained resource levels,
has proven impossible for well over a century.
The underlying reasons for this unhappy situation
are institutional flaws common to many government
marine fishery management systems we have studied
or observed. In both Maryland and Virginia (and the
Potomac River), effective management was long
thwarted by involvement of both the legislative
(committees of the general assemblies as well as the
entire assemblies themselves) and the executive fishery
management bodies. Tension, confusion, and often
contradictory actions have occurred as legislators and
executive "managers" attempted to micromanage the
same resource and industry. Steps have been taken in
Virginia to reduce conflicting legislative/ executive
activities and the legislature has given VMRC more
autonomy in the last several years. Such improvements
have been helpful but ultimately inadequate.
Confusion and inability to achieve coherent,
long-term action was compounded early on in
Maryland by the fact that the public oyster resource was divided. into two parts: (1) that in
internal waters of the counties, and (2) that in state
waters. For over a century, Maryland's Tidewater
counties managed their own internal waters and
the state, the Bay waters. Separate county and
state management apparatuses and regulations
effectively prevented coherent statewide management of resources or harvesters alike until the dual
state/ county management system was abolished
in 1970 (date supplied by Dr. W. P. Jensen).
Unfortunately, the recommendations of the
Maryland Commission on Conservation of Natural
Resources of 1948 resulted in the establishment of
state and county committees of elected oystermen
whose authority and responsibility is to advise (and
even approve?) the Maryland Tidewater Administration on closing oyster bars and shell and seed
planting activities (Kennedy and Breisch 1983).
Thus far, their involvement has ensured that closures
would "inconvenience" themselves (the oystermen)
little. It has also caused shell and seed planting to be
made where politics demanded, not where scientific
data showed they should be (Christy 1964, Kennedy
and Breisch 1983). Such advisory committees exist
at the state level (VMRC) in Virginia. The most
recent of these bodies is the VMRC Reef Commit579
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tee. Their positive contributions to effective
management and conservation and improvement
of the resource have been much like those of their
counterparts in Maryland, almost none.
Even as legislative/ executive conflict and
confusion were being reduced (but not completely)
in both states and the county-state government
management program was eliminated in Maryland,
effective state management of the oyster resource
continued to be unattainable. The basic problem
(over-representation of the users and their interests)
in the management regime has not been corrected in
either state or in the PRFC, which shares the same
afflictions. In all three the harvesters and other users
of the resource were (and are) too intimately involved in the management process. Often the actual
decision making bodies of the VMRC, and the
Maryland Tidewater Administration (and their
predecessors) and the PRFC contained significant
numbers of representatives of the very industry they
were supposed to regulate and their influence on
decisions was overwhelming. Further, official
advisory committees of those agencies were usually
loaded so heavily with oyster harvesters or their
allies and apologists that objective advice was
impossible. Likewise, study commissions, planning
bodies, and other resource-allocation bodies have
been unbalanced in this fashion. In addition, the
systems in both states (and the Potomac River) were
such that, even if the executive management agency
perchance took a responsible step and acted to
prevent overharvesting or to place shells and seed
where and when they should have been, political
pressure from the oystermen could bring about
intervention from higher executive levels or the general
assemblies to negate or even reverse the action.
The influences of special-interest groups in the
management process have been so pervasive that the
interests of the general citizenry and of posterity, who
truly own the resource, have rarely, if ever, been
effectively represented. The "foxes have been guarding
the hen house," and still are - an obvious situation of
rampant (though usually legal) conflict of interest.
Kennedy and Breisch (19&3) came to similar conclusions
after their comprehensive study of 16 decades of oyster
management in Maryland.
It is necessary that this, easily documented, underrepresentation (usually no representation) of the general
citizenry be rectified when decisions regarding use and
allocation of resources are being made in the future.
The public and its posterity are the present, and future,
owners. (In Virginia this right is constitutionally based.)
As such, they have legitimate interests in the present
and future productivity of the public oyster

grounds. The states must find ways to incorporate
those interests in their planning and management
programs and for the Potomac, as well. Suitable
models may already exist in business and economics. If none exist they should be developed.
Undoubtedly, sound accounting methods could
be devised to allow incorporation of the short- and
long-term rights and interests of the owners (the
people and their posterity) as well as the interests
of the users (the harvesters) and the other elements
of industry supported by the public resource into
the policy and decision making process. Perhaps
the interests of the public should be considered
equivalent to those of common, or preferred
stockholders, in a business enterprise.
Certainly, socioeconomic use of fishery resources
should be allowed, to the extent that the resources can
support such and still maintain themselves. We do not
advocate a policy of no economic use! It is in the
public's interests to allow, perhaps even to encourage,
harvesters and other industry elements to use the
resource to generate economic benefits. But it should be
obvious by now that the general citizenry of Virginia,
through actions of the general assembly and VMRC
and its predecessor executive management agencies
have been more than generous and have seen to it that
"the public owners" did allow use of their oyster
resources by oyster harvesters and others in industryincluding private planters. Also, general fund monies
have been expended in the interests of supporting the
industry. The same has occurred in Maryland and the
Potomac. Just as certainly it is not and has not been in
the owner's (the public's) interests to allow the resource
to be eliminated as an economic entity and the resource
base (populations and reefs) to be so damaged that
future natural productivity is reduced, even lost. Yet
that is happening, or already has.
Further, it is not in the public's interests to continue
to subsidize the oyster industries without some
expectation of return in some recognizable form and at
some determinable level within a reasonable time.
Representatives of the citizen owners, the state's (and
PRFC's) managers should not allow such to happen.
But development of economic or accounting
models to allow the interests of the public and
posterity and the several components of the oyster
industry to be appropriately represented in management activities is not a function of this particular
study. Suffice it to say that it should be done. As
former Governor H. F. Byrd, a strong advocate of
conservative government policies, put it so well over
60 years ago; "Virginia as a State has the full right to
ask that this industry [including the resource on
which it is based], [sic] be conserved and adminis580
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tered with broad vision and business efficiency."
(Byrd, 1928).
From time to time ,both states have been able to
institute corrective legislative ,code changes or regulations designed to improve the public oyster resource,
and ultimately the fishery dependent thereon, but have
often been unable to effectively enforce them. At times,
even local law enforcement officials, including justices
at various levels of the judicial system, have thwarted
management efforts.
Both states and the PRFC have undertaken
costly repletion programs but have been unable to
capitalize upon them. Pressure from harvesters
often prevented effective repletion by causing
shells to be squandered by placement in the wrong
places and/or at the wrong time. At the same time
the oyster's favored habitat, the oyster reefs, has
been so severely reduced Bay-wide by harvesting
that the "footprints" of many once-massive reefs
are now buried in silt. In Virginia's critically
important James River, attempts by the state to
replenish the remaining, historically productive
active reefs with shell have been almost totally
prevented until just this year (1994). Additionally,
wherever shells (or seed) hav,e been "properly" planted
on public reefs, pressure from oystermen on the oystermanagement agencies of Virginia, Maryland, and the
Potomac River have usually prevented the public
oyster bars or reefs so repleni:;hed from being closed to
harvest for sufficiently long time periods to allow
rebuilding of those reefs or the populations thereon.
Consequently, the Chesapeake Bay oyster repletion
programs have operated as "put-and-take" activities,
serving essentially as continuing subsidies for the
harvesters and the rest of the industry dependent on
public oysters. No significant rebuilcling of reefs,
broodstocks, broodstock quality, or overall populations,
which should have been prime objectives of oyster bar
repletion programs, has occurred. Throughout,
violation of regulations and restrictions, of closed hours
or seasons, of culling rules or size limits or, in some
cases, of closed areas by scofflaw harvesters have been
common. Overrepresentatio:n of the users (the exploiters) is the basic flaw in the fisheries (oyster) management apparatuses and operations in both Bay states and
the PRFC. It has proven "fatal" thus far. Until this fatal
flaw is elimmated from the management system,
effective management of the oyster resource will be
prevented and the public's oyster populations and the
reef habitats they do best on will continue to decline
into "economic" oblivion. Waste of public money and
natural resources will continue. Even worse, the longterm interests of the citizenry (and its posterity) will be
violated as the potential productivity of Bay waters

as oyster-growing environments is foregone. The
phrase "potential productivity" is apropos because
many of the public oyster grounds of both states could,
can, and will yield oysters if the reefs, the remaining or
recovering broodstocks and their survival-favoring
genetic properties are enabled to restore themselves.
They should be helped to do so.

RECOMMENDATIONS
The theme of this conference has been "Toward a
Sustainable Coastal Watershed: The Chesapeake
Experiment." Clearly the Chesapeake Bay states have
not achieved sustainable public oyster resources,
sustained oyster reefs, or a sustainable locally-supplied
oyster processing and marketing industry. Beginning
from an essentially untouched resource with a selfrenewing population probably numbering in the
billions of individuafa when the Virginia Colony and
the Maryland Proprietorship were established in 1607
and 1634, respectively, man has almost exhausted the
Chesapeake oyster resource in only 200-250 years of
intensive use. If improvements in the state oyster
management programs do not occur, the public
oyster resource of the Chesapeake will become
economically extinct.
What of the future of the public oyster resource of
the Chesapeake drainage basin? Can C. virginica
recover? Can they attain some significant level of their
past natural productivity? We believe they can, provided their favored, self-sustaining reef habitats are
allowed, preferably assisted, to restore themselves.
Nature has proved that over some seven millennia of
natural experimentaffon with the Chesapeake oyster.
Can an industry based upon harvests from selfrenewing oyster populations of C. virginica be restored?
We believe the answer to be yes. Off-the-bottom culture
using native oysters ,:onducted by scientists at VIlvfS,
and elsewhere, has demonstrated that native oysters
can survive to market size, even in disease prone areas.
Sufficient numbers of native oysters survive to provide
spawn for reef rehabilitation and stock strengthening.
Their effectiveness in doing so can be enhanced.
Furthermore, signs of abatement of disease-caused
mortalities have begun to appear in the James River as
winter and spring salinities returned to more normal
levels in 1992, 1993 ,and 1994. We expect the same to
happen in Maryland and Virginia's lower-salinity
waters: Indeed, it probably already has. Preservation
or restoration of reefs, nature's off-bottom oyster
culture "devices," will contribute significantly to
revival of public oyster resources.
Unfortunately, populations and habitat have been
allowed to deteriorate so long that recovery, aided or
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unaided, will require considerable time. But, no matter
what techniques or level of effort or monetary investment are applied, recovery will not happen unless
corrective or restorative activities are accompanied, and
followed, by effective control of harvesting effort. This
will not occur unless the overwhelming negative
(contrary) influence of members of the oyster industry
and/ or their apologists is eliminated (or markedly
reduced) from crucial decision making processes.
Without the necessary organizational and operational
changes to do so, it will not be possible to restore, or
probably even to maintain, the public oyster resources
or the industry based thereon for any significant period
of time. In Virginia, failure to act positively will affect
private as well as public oyster production. As matters
stand, the reproductive potential of the James River
seed oyster reefs may be so damaged that full recovery
of Virginia's private oyster planting industry may not
be possible, even if survival of adult oysters on leased
grounds improves.
The advice· of harvesters and other oyster industry
persons should be sought as needed but the decision
making bodies, themselves, must be capable of:
1. assuming objective viewpoints,
2. considering and integrating scientific information,
3. considering the overall, long-term ecological and
socioeconomic interests involved,
4. adopting a conservative attitude toward the
resource,
5. considering the long-term, and not just the
immediate, needs of the public oyster industry,
6. considering the welfare and interests of the general
citizenries of Virginia, Maryland, and the Potomac
River basin and their posterity,
7. developing effective long-term management
plan that can be modified as necessary,
8. enacting regulations to accomplish the goals of
the plans, and
9. effectively enforcing the regulations necessary
to maintain a strengthened, self-renewing public
oyster resources and sustainable, controlled fishery

inimicable socioeconomic or human political desires
or decisions!)
The need for these characteristics has long been
recognized but not yet achieved in any state or regional
fishery management body with which we are familiar.
H these goals are not realiz.ed, the public oyster resource
seems doomed to economic extinction and Virginia's
and Maryland's public working watermen will lose yet
another self-renewing fishery resource that has
helped sustain them and their way of life in the past.
Further, the filtering and particle-altering capabilities of
the once-vast, but now severely reduced, Chesapeake
oyster populations and the natural fishing reefs
they once provided at no cost will continue
severely reduced.
It is too early to speculate that the Chesapeake oyster
may actually be driven to extinction but it may well
reach the endangered species status. Several oncenumerous fishery species have been reduced to the
economic extinction and endangered species categories
by the combination of overharvesting and scarcitydriven price increase and increasing vulnerability of
reduced and geographically limited populations to
natural or man-made hazards.
For the future of the Chesapeake Bay and continuing, sustainable yields of ecologically and socioeconomically valuable species, especially the oyster, it is
necessary that the management apparatuses in both
states be significantly and effectively modified! Management functions dealing with repletion reef establishment and/ or rebuilding and harvesting pressure
controls must be freed from the political influences
which have brought the resource and industry to such a
low state. Specifically, responsibility for development of
critical decisions such as establishment of annual
(harvesting season) quotas, places, times, and methodology for seeding and shelling, establishment of
sanctuary reefs and closures and openings, items
necessary to the recovery and continuation of the public
and private oyster resource and the industry based
thereon, should be assigned to a separate, independent
body organized somewhat like the Federal Reserve
System. Such decisions could then be passed to VMRC,
the PRFC or the Maryland Tidewater Administration
for action. Alternatively, VMRC, the PRFC and the
Maryland Tidewater Administration should be
restructured and constituted of politically independent
members whose knowledge, and stipulated duties and
responsibilities would ensure that sound, objective
management decisions would be taken in the light
of competent scientific and economic information
and with the overall welfare of the citizens of the
commonwealth and of posterity as its central
operating theme. Other, better models with which

efforts.

Development of long-term management plans,
repletion programs, and harvesting controls (quotas)
must be under the control of politically independent,
objective bodies organized and operated much like the
Federal Reserve Banking system.
Scientifically sound data must be the basis of
future rehabilitation efforts and of subsequent
management. Scientific advice must be sought
and effectively utilized. Management by politically contrived and driven compromise and
consensus has not worked and will not work in
the future! (Nature does not operate according to
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we are not familiar may exist. If so they can be
brought forward and considered. It is apparent
that present institutional anangements for oyster
(and other) fishery management are not working and
must be changed!
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